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Political finance scholars have paid little attention to the partisan preferences of business 
donors.  This was because business donors were overwhelmingly concerned with the left-right 
dimension and enjoyed stable relationships with centre-right parties.  These parties are 
increasingly tempted by nationalist positions on a globalisation dimension.  This new 
ideological flux provides an opportunity to measure the extent to which donors are party 
identifiers or react to changes in the policy space. Dramatic shifts in party policy on both 
dimensions and a relatively transparent political finance regime make the UK a particularly 
apposite case to study this question. I analyse 19,000 donations to the Conservative Party and 
show that business donors reacted strongly to recent shifts on both the left-right and 
globalisation dimensions.  Thus, centre-right parties cannot rely on party identification and 
their left-right position to maintain business funding.  Economic nationalism costs centre-right 
parties money.  
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Capitalism can be a problem for democratic politicians.  The concentration of economic power 
that capitalism produces challenges the political equality on which democracy is premised.  
The relationship between capitalism and democracy can be particularly controversial in 
political finance (Scarrow 2007, 193), where business money can give an important advantage 
to favoured candidates and parties (Benoit and Marsh 2003; Jacobson 1998; Fisher 1999).  
Nevertheless, scholars of political finance have paid little attention to the party political 
preferences of business.  This was for the very good reason the there was so much stability in 
the policy space relevant to business and the relationships between political parties and their 
business funders.  This stability made it difficult to assess the strength and nature of business 
preferences and whether business donations to parties were a rational choice or a relatively 
automatic party identification.  The policy space for business is no longer stable and its party 
political preferences can no longer be taken for granted. 
The consensus on globalisation is teetering.  Centre-right parties have to decide whether to 
adopt nationalist positions on multilateral economic governance.  Nationalist populism opens 
up a second policy and ideological dimension that is vital to business.  Political parties may be 
amenable to business on the left-right dimension, but threatening on the globalisation 
dimension.  This puts business in the difficult political situation of having to decide whether 
the left-right or globalisation dimension is most important.  This dilemma is particularly acute 
for business funders of political parties.  Contemporary British politics offers special 
opportunities to study this issue.  The Conservative Party has spent most of the last two years 
committed to a so-called “Hard Brexit” that almost inevitably involves reduced access to the 
largest market for UK business, along with disruption of long-established supply chains.  The 
Labour Party has its most left-wing leader since at least 1983 and the radical left is increasingly 
prominent at all levels of the party.  This is distressing for a business sector that has relied on 
and bankrolled the Conservative Party as its political representative for a century and, not so 
long ago, enjoyed the Labour Party also making a claim to be the “Natural Party of Business”.  
The funders of the Conservative Party need to make up their minds as to which is more 
frightening, the left-wing politics of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour or the nationalist foreign 
economic policy of Theresa May’s Conservative Party.   
In the new more complex and fluid policy space, donations to political parties can provide new 
insights into the preferences of donors and indeed into whether policy positions, or party 
identification, drive donations.  Britain’s system of political finance regulation offers a clearer 
insight than most because it is relatively permissive and transparent.  It is permissive in that 
there is little constraint on the size, purpose, and timing of donations.  They represent their 
donors’ intentions, not the effects of regulation.  It is transparent in that the source and size of 
many donations is reported.  I study 19,000 donations to the Conservative Party between 2001 
and the end of 2017.  My equations show that Corbyn’s election was associated with a very 
large influx of donations to the Conservative Party, but that the Brexit vote was associated with 
a somewhat smaller drop in donations.  This suggests a major constraint on the longer-term 
adoption of a nationalist agenda by the Conservative Party.  The Tories risk sacrificing their 
party’s finances and, therefore, some of their electability, for the sake of a nationalist position 
in foreign economic policy.  This result raises the question of the relative salience of the two 
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dimensions to business sectors in other countries where national populism appears to be on the 
rise. 
The article proceeds by locating this work in the literature on business and political finance.  It 
argues that an analogy between business donations to parties and electoral behaviour is a useful 
way to approach political finance in an era of ideological change.  Next, I argue that the UK is 
a good case because the recent policy shifts by both major parties offer variation on the 
independent variable and the political finance regime allows a relatively clean measure of the 
preferences of donor businesses.  In the empirical section, I study business and individual 
donations from 2001 to 2017.  I also study the impact of the media prominence of the “Hard” 
and “Soft Brexit” options in the Brexit era.  The conclusion summarises implications for 
political finance theory and party competition in established democracies. 
 
BUSINESS, PREFERENCES, AND POLITICAL FINANCE 
Power and preferences have been the two main concerns of scholars of business and politics.  
For a long time, the literature emphasised structural power (Lindblom 1977; Offe 1985, 170–
220).  The dependence of democratic politics on the capitalist economy gave business a 
structural advantage.  The threat, or even possibility, of disinvestment was seen as enough to 
ensure that politicians did as business wished.  Structural power made intentional power, 
principally lobbying and financial donations, both more effective and less necessary.  However, 
there is lots of evidence that democratic politicians defy businesses.  Ultimately, office-seeking 
politicians are elected by voters, not firms, and policy-seeking politicians often want to 
constrain, rather than facilitate, businesses.  The theory of quiet politics asserts that “[B]usiness 
power goes down as political salience goes up” (Culpepper 2011, 177).  When voters and the 
media are paying attention, politicians are sceptical of business arguments.  By contrast, the 
public have little interest in most of the arcana of public policy that impact business.  In these 
low-salience areas, politicians tend to defer to the expertise of business.  Business has a 
particular “informational privilege” (Bernhagen 2007, 135) that allows it to convince 
politicians to adopt policies that fully-informed policy-makers would reject as detrimental to 
their voters’ interests.   
Power has also been a concern of the more specific literature on business financing of politics.  
The nature and the extent of the power of business donations depend on their motivation.  
Business donors have pragmatic or ideological motivations (Harrigan 2017).  “The pragmatic 
motivation seeks private goods … pragmatic money is interested money” (McMenamin 2013, 
8).  It is rare for business to directly buy policy in established democracies.  Many of the more 
convincing accounts of the relationship between donations and policy can be also be thought 
of in terms of salience and information.  Policy-makers are time-poor, as well as information-
poor.  They cannot give a full hearing to all of the informationally-privileged business actors 
clamouring to lobby them.  Moreover, politicians want to minimise the electoral costs of being 
perceived to be make decisions for the good of businesses instead of voters.  Money can 
improve access to policy-makers in order to leverage informational advantages in low-salience 
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areas.  In these situations, there is a reciprocal exchange between business donors and 
politicians. In reciprocal exchanges, each actor’s part of the exchange is separately performed 
and terms are unstated and uncertain (Molm 2000, 261-2). These reciprocal exchanges protect 
politicians against accusations that they are selling decisions, as there is no direct connection 
between the donation and public policy (McMenamin 2013, 12).  This is one reason that 
statistical studies find it so hard to demonstrate a relationship between political finance and 
policy (Stratmann 2017, 12-18).  The other is that many donations are ideologically motivated 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2003; McMenamin 2012, 2).  Ideological payments promote a public good.  
“They express a preference for government based on a particular set of values and 
assumptions” (McMenamin 2013, 8). 
The preferences of business can be studied individually or systemically.  The Varieties-of-
Capitalism approach offers a persuasive account of how national political and economic 
institutions shape business preferences over public policy.  These institutions were born out of 
negotiations around the time of the birth of mass democracy and labour unionism.  In multi-
party systems, right-wing party leaders had incentives to delegate decision-making to business 
associations and labour unions (Martin and Swank 2012, 3).  They believed that a corporatist 
framework was more beneficial to business than fighting a losing battle in a legislature where 
farmers’ and workers’ parties could outvote pro-business parties. By contrast, in two-party 
systems, the right concentrated on the prize of a majority in the legislature and had much 
weaker incentives to delegate policy to representative associations.  These different origins 
explain much about the extent to which business acts collectively and its preferences over 
economic and social policy (Martin and Swank 2012, 227).  The “Open Economy Approach” 
has also focused on the interaction of economic interests and political institutions.  The factor 
model assumes that business preferences will be driven by the relative prices of capital and 
labour.  The sector model argues that business preferences will be shared with employees and 
other businesses in the same sector.  Of course, ultimately these economic interests have to be 
processed by institutions within the firm (Martin 1995).  Majoritarian electoral systems elect 
politicians in small territorial units, thereby emphasising sectoral preferences, whereas 
proportional electoral systems elect politicians in large constituencies, thereby facilitating the 
unity of capitalists.   
The approaches mentioned above concentrate on policy preferences, not party preferences.  
They tend to assume that party preferences follow from policy positions.  In the Varieties-of-
Capitalism school the importance of political party differences depends on the national 
institutional comparative advantage.  In co-ordinated economies, business associations enjoy 
deep relations with policy-makers regardless of the composition of government (Hall and 
Soskice 2001).  In liberal economies, government-business relations are more distant and also 
subject to greater change when there is a governmental turnover.  Liberal economies are 
associated with a more intense business preference for pro-business parties.  The factor 
approach should be associated with a clear identification with the political right, but the sector 
approach allows for more nuanced partisan preferences, depending on the nature of the sector 
and common cause with workers.  Both, in their different ways, assume that businesses make 
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a rational choice on the basis of a very or somewhat stable political economy.  Neither pays 
much attention to a radical change in the positions of political parties.   
The literature on business and political finance has neglected the preferences of businesses.   In 
relation to ideological contributions, it has taken preferences over policy and between parties 
for granted.  For over a century this has been a relatively safe assumption for many nations 
because there has been only one relevant dimension of competition and the order of parties on 
that dimension has not changed.  This dimension has been the classic left-right continuum of 
state intervention versus the free market.  The ideological distance between parties changes as 
does the location of the centre of the policy space.  Nonetheless, parties virtually never 
exchange positions in two-party systems and very rarely do so in multi-party systems.  
Therefore, there has been an obvious long-term centre-right party, which can receive business 
funding.  This stability has meant that ideological distance, issue salience, and party 
identification have not been as important in the relationship between business and parties as 
they have been in the more dynamic electoral market.   
Changes in the political preferences of business have substantial ramifications for many of the 
questions studied by political finance scholars.  Regulation affects party competition differently 
if one party can count on donations from business.  If this is so, public funding can reduce the 
financial advantage of such parties (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; Van Biezen and Rashkova 
2014; Potter and Tavits 2013).  Bans, limits, and disclosure requirements can transform a 
financial advantage for pro-business parties into a financial disadvantage (McMenamin 2015).  
If some parties receive substantial funding from business, it is hard to resist the conclusion that 
this will affect public policy when they are in government (Hacker and Pierson 2010).  If parties 
are unequally dependent on business funding, this will influence how they construct their 
interests in political finance reform (Koß 2011; Scarrow 2004).  The way in which broader 
public policy affects funders will depend on whether those funders represent the business sector 
(McMenamin 2012, 9-13; Tomashevskiy 2015).  If some parties are more dependent on 
business than others, this will affect public opinion on political finance, especially preferences 
on the regulation of business donations and the political construction of scandals (Fisher 2015a; 
McMenamin 2015).  Since attitudes to, and relationships with, business are so strongly 
associated with the left-right dimension, they are an important part of most party systems.  
When business donations are legal this means party positions on business tend to be also 
important for political finance.  Indeed, if enforcement is weak, the same can be said for 
countries where business donations are illegal.   
The literature on business donations to political parties has paid little attention to the dynamism 
of parties.  This is for the good reasons that only one dimension has been relevant and the order 
of parties along this dimension has been so stable.  Therefore, it is reasonable to think that 
businesses, unlike voters, have not been faced with a choice.  In the absence of changes in the 
policy space big enough to change the preferred party of business, it has not been possible to 
assess whether enduring funding relationships are due to party identification on the part of 
business or the closeness of parties to business in the policy space.  A major change to the 
policy space could potentially reveal much about the policy preferences of donor businesses 
and the extent to which their donations reflect party identification or a rational choice based on 
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the party’s policies.   Ironically, there are some respects in which theories of voting apply better 
to political finance than they do to voting.  Voting is a rare event, the occasion for which the 
voter does not choose.  In some electoral systems, voters are offered a categorical choice and 
in others they are presented with an ordinal choice.  Since donors control when, how often, and 
how much they donate their donations can potentially provide much more information about 
their preferences than do the votes of citizens.  The next section argues that the UK is 
particularly apposite case to study this question. 
 
BUSINESS AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Business donations to political parties in the UK are largely ideological rather than pragmatic.  
Businesses do not switch between the two major parties depending on which is in government; 
they do not hedge by contributing to both; and few contribute to the Labour party at all.  
Donations to the Conservative Party are dynamic and it is possible that some of this represents 
an interaction of ideological and pragmatic motivations, such that businesses only donate to 
their ideologically-preferred partner the Conservative Party, but are more likely to do so when 
there are pragmatic reasons for donating.  In other words, businesses contribute more to the 
Conservatives when they are in government and when they are popular, and therefore likely to 
retain, or regain, control of government.  Nevertheless, my focus will remain on the ideological 
motivation, as this is where party political preferences are relevant.  
The centre-right Conservative and Unionist Party has been the party of business in the United 
Kingdom for a century (Fisher 1994).  It moved to the right under Margaret Thatcher in the 
1980s and then towards the centre under David Cameron from 2005.  Being pro-market has 
not always meant that the party’s policies were in the interests of the business establishment.  
For example, financial deregulation under Thatcher undermined many banks in the City of 
London.  Nonetheless, businesses have only had to think about how much they like 
Conservative policy, not whether they prefer Labour or the Conservatives.  The Labour Party 
has also travelled along the left-right dimension.  It adopted a radical leftist manifesto in 1983 
and was dragged to the centre by a succession of leaders.  In 1998 Prime Minister Tony Blair 
even declared that Labour wanted to be the “natural party of business”.  Nonetheless, business 
continued to provide substantial funding to the Conservatives, while contributing little to 
Labour (McMenamin 2011).  The Conservatives suffer from a lower income than their Labour 
rivals (Fisher 2015b, 134; Fisher 2018, 177), who have a greater ability to raise small donations 
that do not have to be individually declared.  In terms of declared donations, from 2001 to 
2017, the Conservatives raised fifteen per cent more than Labour.  If their income from business 
had been the same as Labour’s they would have raised twelve per cent less in declared 
donations and been at a substantially greater financial disadvantage.1   
Like other actors businesses look to the leadership for an indicator of the policies of a political 
party.  So, in discussing the contemporary situation, I concentrate on the party leaderships, not 
                                                          
1 These figures are from the UK Electoral Commission and exclude public funds. Business donations are 
defined as contributions from companies and limited liability partnerships.   
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the members or even the parliamentary parties.  For one hundred years, business was able to 
assess politics along one dimension, the left-right continuum.  Since the Conservatives were 
always to the right to Labour, business did not have much difficulty in choosing its favourite.  
The emergence of Jeremy Corbyn has re-emphasised the importance of this dimension.  
However, Brexit has introduced a new nationalism-globalism dimension.  The Conservative 
party policy is still centre-right on left-right issues.  However, its ‘Hard Brexit’ policy is a 
nationalist position that emphasises national sovereignty and local control and is hostile to the 
pooling of sovereignty with other European countries and any notion of foreign influence over 
trade policy.  Many Brexiteers advocate ‘a global Britain’, champion free trade and de-
regulation, and want to pivot away from declining Europe to the dynamism of Asia and 
Britain’s former colonies.  They do not propose protectionism or self-sufficiency, but all such 
trade must happen in the context of national sovereignty.  Indeed, national sovereignty, ‘taking 
back control’, not a new economic dynamism, often appears to be the ultimate aim (Shrimsley 
2018).  For the first time in a century, there is no British party which is clearly pro-business.  
There is a Conservative Party that is nationalist in foreign economic policy and a Labour Party 
that is socialist in domestic economic policy.  The ideological position of the parties as a whole 
has moved in the same direction, but much less dramatically than that of their leaderships 
(Schmitt and Loughran 2017).  The Conservative Party has many MPs and members who are 
concerned about economic consequences of a ‘Hard Brexit’.  Many Labour MPs still regard 
Mr Corbyn’s ideas as extreme and impractical.  The opinions of these politicians will be of 
little comfort or relevance to British business should the UK leave the EU without a customs 
union arrangement, or industries be renationalised (Gordon and Pickard 2017).    
British business largely supported staying in the EU.  However, a small number of variables 
predicted whether a business was “remain” or “leave”: where the headquarters is located, 
ownership structure, the location of profits or trade, and calculations on foreign direct 
investment (McKay 2016, 3).  The business leaders in favour of leaving the EU traded mostly 
in the UK and saw a “cost advantage or the opportunity to influence the political process after 
separation” (McKay 2016, 3).  After the vote in favour of leaving the EU, the preference for 
remain effectively became a preference for a “soft Brexit” over a “hard Brexit”.  A soft Brexit 
implies minimal disruption, such as leaving the EU institutions but retaining access to the 
European single market and therefore remaining subject to the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice.  A hard Brexit implies leaving the single market and usually the customs union 
too.  The UK would have full control over immigration and trade, but would face substantial 
barriers in trade of goods and services with the EU.   
A hard Brexit was the policy of the Conservative government from the Party Conference in 
October 2016 to at least until the Chequers meeting of the British cabinet in July 2018.  The 
government maintained that divergence in regulation is consistent with continuing frictionless 
trade with Europe.  Critics, including EU negotiators, said this was impossible.  So, the 
implications of the government’s position seemed to point towards a harder Brexit than the 
government’s explicit preferences.  Labour has been unclear and Mr Corbyn ambivalent for 
much of the period since the referendum.  In February 2018, Jeremy Corbyn gave a speech 
committing Labour to negotiating a new customs union with the European Union. It was both 
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unsurprising and amazing that business leaders lined up behind socialist Corbyn.  For example, 
Carolyn Fairbairn, director general of the Confederation of British Industry, said, “The Labour 
leader’s commitment to a customs union will put jobs and living standards first by remaining 
in a close economic relationship with the EU” (Kentish 2018).   
Obviously, Corbyn and Brexit are unique and highly contingent phenomena.  Corbyn had to 
be persuaded to run for party leader.  He aimed to keep the flag flying for socialism in the 
Labour Party and did not initially regard himself as serious competitor for the leadership.  The 
Brexit referendum resulted from a promise that David Cameron made to quell a rebellious 
faction in his party.  He was not a Brexit advocate and Brexit was very much a minority position 
in the parliament that approved the referendum.  Of course, the Brexit vote itself was only won 
by 3.8 per cent.  Nonetheless, both are particular cases of more general phenomena.  The 
seeming abandonment of the median voter for a more ambitious and inspiring ideological 
vision is commonplace in politics, even in largely two-party systems like Britain’s.  The 
populist revolt against globalisation is the political theme of the moment.  Centre-right parties 
in many countries, the US, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria, just to name a 
few, have tacked towards populist positions on immigration and economic globalisation in 
recent years.  The observational equivalence of rational choice and party identification 
donations is typical of the history of many established democracies. The potential for the 
emergence of a second dimension in their contemporary politics is also evident in many 
established democracies.  The tumult of recent British politics offers an unprecedented 
opportunity to study which matters most to the business sector, the left-right dimension or the 
nationalism-globalism dimension?  It also allows us to probe whether donations are motivated 
by a rational choice or party identification.  Next, I introduce the data I use to study these 
questions. 
 
DATA FROM THE UK ELECTORAL COMMISSION 
The data on British political donations, like that generated by perhaps all disclosure regimes 
other the USA’s, is under-utilised.  I study all 18,963 donations reported by the Conservative 
Party between 12 February 2001 and 31 December 2017.  This represents 6,166 days and 
approximately 6,212 donors.  The data was cleaned to reduce over-counting of donors due to 
typographical errors, spelling, punctuation, honorific variations, and donations by different 
sections or brands of the same business.    A prominent example of the latter is JC Bamford 
Excavators, JCB Sales, JCB Research, etc.   Nonetheless, there is still some small overcounting 
of the number of distinct donors.  The purpose of the analysis is to assess how this highly 
politicised section of the business community, the Conservative donors, reacted to the election 
of Corbyn and the decision to the leave the European Union.  To this end the observations are 
daily aggregates.  The dependent variable is the number of distinct donors on a given day. This 
is intended to gauge donor support for the Conservatives.   The Electoral Commission classifies 
donations by the legal status of the donor.  I exclude all such categories other than individual, 
company, and limited liability partnership.  This means three categories representing 
substantial funds are not included.  These are public funds, trusts, and unincorporated 
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associations.  The latter two types of donor tend to be fundraising arms of the Conservative 
Party itself, such as Holborn & St Pancras Conservative Association or the Lord Woolton 
Luncheon Club.2  The other categories are only responsible for small amounts of funding.  I 
combine the legal categories of company and limited liability partnership and label them as 
business, to indicate the overwhelming probability that they are profit-seeking organisations.  
The dependent variable is computed for individual and business donors.  Due to the regulatory 
changes of 2010 models are restricted to donations of at least £7,500 to achieve consistency 
over time. 
To control for variations in the pragmatic and ideological motivations over time, I include a 
number of control variables.  First, there is an indicator for whenever the Conservatives are in 
government. In the British political system, the government is very powerful and the legislature 
traditionally weak.  If government is associated with more donations, this could indicate a 
pragmatic motivation.  Second, there is an indicator for electoral campaigns, defined as the 
period from the dissolution of parliament to election day.  Ideological donors will want to help 
their preferred party when its need is greatest; pragmatic donors may also calculate that the 
reciprocation is more likely when money is provided at a time of great need.  Third, there is a 
count of the days since the election.  Pragmatic donations should be negatively associated with 
this variable because the more time a party has in power the more likely it is to be able to 
deliver a policy benefit.  Ideological donations should be positively associated with it, as donors 
will wish to help their party prepare for a forthcoming election.  Fourth comes the 
Conservatives’ lead over Labour as measured by ICM’s voting intention polls.  Pragmatic 
donors will know that a popular party is more likely to be able to deliver benefits than an 
unpopular one.  Popularity may also be positively associated with ideological donations, as 
businesses share in general approval of the party’s positioning in the policy space. The fifth 
and last control is a time trend. 
The independent variables are indicators for the periods since the election of Corbyn and since 
the Brexit vote.  Corbyn represents a major policy shift on the part of the Labour party on the 
left-right dimension.  If business donors did not react, donors are driven by party identification, 
not rational choice.  Brexit represents a major policy shift on the part of the Conservative Party 
on the globalisation dimension.  If business donors did not react, they seem to be driven by 
party identification, not rational choice.  While the Brexit and Corbyn shifts were both very 
large, it is not possible to say which was larger.  Nonetheless, a big difference between the 
reactions to the two shifts would appear to suggest that one dimension is more salient to 
business than the other.   
Figure 1 shows donations by distinct individual and business donors, as well as the 
Conservatives’ lead in polls over Labour, across the whole time period.  There is evidently a 
strong correlation between individual and business donations.  Moreover, the importance of 
the control variables is obvious.  The number of donations climbs steeply around each of the 
five elections in the dataset.  There also seems to be a strong association between the popularity 
                                                          
2 Unincorporated Associations are required to report gifts in excess of £7,500 in a calendar year, but only one 
association has reported such gifts and then from only two sources.   
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of the Conservatives and donations.  The time trend is more subtle, but there does appear to be 
an increase in donations over time.   
Comparing business and individual donations allows me to probe the validity of inferences 
about business donations.  There are very strong theoretical reasons to expect some contrasts 
in the behaviour of businesses and individuals.  Businesses are rational by design.  Directors 
are legally obliged to promote the financial interests of shareholders.  This means that 
businesses are much more likely to make pragmatic donations, and much less likely to make 
ideological donations, than individuals (McMenamin 2009; Burris 2001).  If control variables 
linked to pragmatism are more strongly associated with business donations, inferences about 
motivation are that much stronger.   Relative business rationality is also relevant to preferences.  
Business preferences should be more driven by the policy space, as opposed to party 
identification, than the preferences of individual donors.  To the extent that business reactions 
to policy shifts are stronger than those of individuals, inferences about the source of preferences 
are stronger.  
 
Fig. 1. Donations by Distinct Donors 
Table 1 presents two regressions evaluating the impact of Corbyn and Brexit on donations to 
the Conservative party by businesses and individuals.  Since the dependent variable is an 
overdispersed count I use a negative binomial model.  The standard errors are HAC Newey 
West to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.   
TABLE 1 Negative Binomial Model of Donations to the Conservative Party 
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 Business Individual 
Government 0.2698** 0.0611 
 (0.1158) (0.1431) 
Campaign 0.9159*** 1.3202*** 
 (0.0998) (0.0976) 
Days Since Election 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Conservative Lead 3.0464*** 2.9629*** 
 (0.5130) (0.4843) 
Corbyn 0.3513*** 0.0556 
 (0.0543) (0.0894) 
Brexit -0.2113*** -0.3049*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0239) 
Trend 0.0000 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Intercept  -1.7585*** -1.4200*** 
 (0.0679) (0.1056) 
Log Likelihood -4853.7429 -6767.9035 
N 6166 6166 
Note: HAC Newey-West Standard Errors in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, 
***p ≤ 0.01 
 
The control variables show the expected contrasts between distinct business and individual 
donations.  Government is associated with a large increase in business donations, but the 
increase for individual donations is less than a quarter of that for business and is statistically 
insignificant.  The campaign is associated with more donations, whether business or individual.  
However, the increase is about fifty per cent bigger for individuals, which makes sense, given 
that this period would appear to be more likely to attract ideological than pragmatic donations.  
The number of days since the election is positively associated with both business and individual 
donations, suggesting an ideological motivation, and the coefficients are virtually the same 
size.  Finally, both are again positively associated with the Conservatives’ lead over Labour.  
The coefficient is slightly bigger for business, perhaps suggesting a more pragmatic motivation, 
but the difference between it and the coefficient for individuals is statistically insignificant.  
Overall, these comparisons suggest the reassuring conclusion that business donations are more 
pragmatic than individual donations.  Next come the two policy shifts.  Corbyn’s election 
provided a very large stimulus to business donations, but did not have a statistically significant 
effect on individual donations.  Brexit had a large negative effect on both, but the coefficient 
in the individuals’ equation is almost fifty per cent bigger than that in the business equation.  
These contrasts suggest that business reacts more to policy shifts than individuals, probably 
because individuals are more driven by identification with the Conservative Party instead of a 
rational choice linking party policy to financial gain.  They might also imply that the businesses 
and individuals attribute very different saliences to the two dimensions represented by Corbyn 
and Brexit.  The left-right dimension may not matter so much to individual donors, compared 
to the globalisation dimension.  Donation patterns suggest that both the left-right and 
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globalisation dimensions are very important to the businesses that donate to the Conservative 
Party.   
 
Fig. 2. Selected coefficients from Model One 
Figure 2 plots key coefficients and confidence intervals from the business equation.  Its purpose 
is to illustrate the magnitude of the effects of the policy changes, compared to the other 
variables which capture ever-present aspects of political competition and the electoral clock.  
They suggest that both policy shifts had very large effects on donor behaviour.  Corbyn’s 
election generated a bonus in business donations almost a third-greater than being in 
government.  Brexit produced a reduction in donations that was almost eighty per cent of the 
gain from being in government.  Both the policy shifts have effects that are much smaller than 
the influx of donations associated with a parliamentary election campaign.  However, this is, 
of course, a very unusual, and short (less than a month), period of political life.  Corbyn’s effect 
was also greater than a standard deviation increase in the number of days since an election (515 
days), while the effect of Brexit was a little bit smaller than this standard deviation increase.  
Both Corbyn and Brexit had a bigger effect than a one standard deviation increase in the 
Conservatives’ lead over Labour.  This means that both policy shifts had a greater impact on 
business donations than a six per cent change in the Conservatives’ poll rating relative to 
Labour.  The coefficients from a negative binomial model are difficult to interpret directly.  
The Incidence Rate Ratios for Model One imply that donations under Brexit were 81 percent 
of what they otherwise would have been and that donations after Corbyn were 142 per cent of 
what they otherwise would have been.  This analysis shows that both policy shifts had the 
Government
Campaign
SD increase in days since election
SD increase in lead over Labour
Corbyn
Brexit
-.5 0 .5 1
Coefficient and 95% Confidence Interval
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potential to transform the relationship between the Conservative Party and its donors, but that 
they cancelled each other out to a substantial extent.   
The period since the referendum on leaving the EU is clearly a new era in British politics.  
Nonetheless, not all Brexits are equally damaging for business.  Since the referendum, British 
politics has been dominated by a debate about what sort of Brexit the UK should seek.  This 
has been framed along a continuum from “hard” to “soft”.  A “hard Brexit” aspires to a very 
substantial disengagement from the EU, freeing the UK from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and allowing the UK to negotiate its own trade deals with other countries.  A 
“soft Brexit” means a relatively modest separation with the UK remaining in the Single Market 
and subject to the EU’s jurisdiction, but withdrawing from its decision-making institutions.  
The length of the time series allows me to make inferences based on comparisons with previous 
eras of Conservative government and relative popularity.  Nonetheless, the previous models 
are based on a stark comparison of pre- and post-referendum contexts.  In Table 2, I present 
assessments of the impact of the debate on the nature of Brexit on Conservative donations.  
Since it is restricted to the period since the referendum there are no Brexit, Corbyn, or 
Government variables.  I add two new variables Hard and Soft, which measure the number 
articles every fortnight in the British press mentioning “Hard Brexit” and “Soft Brexit” 
respectively.3  Figure 3 shows these measures from July 2016 to December 2017.  The Hard 
and Soft variables are highly dynamic and strongly correlated with each other.  However, Hard 
seems much more prone to spiking.  The two tallest spikes relate directly to Prime Minister 
Theresa May’s two clearest speeches on Brexit.  They indicate a high level of validity.  Since 
the Hard and Soft variables are non-stationary, I enter the first difference of both in the 
equations.   
                                                          
3 These are the twenty print and on-line titles in the Lexis News database.   
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Fig. 3. Articles Mentioning Hard and Soft Brexit 
Note: The variables represent two-weekly totals of articles returned by keyword search on 
Nexis news, with intermediate points interpolated.   
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TABLE 2 Negative Binomial Model of Donations to the Conservative Party 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Business Individual 
Campaign 0.8437*** 1.5528*** 
 (0.0717) (0.0664) 
Days Since Election 0.0005** 0.0012*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Conservative Lead 7.9720*** 3.6657*** 
 (0.6938) (0.8797) 
D Hard -0.0052** -0.0039** 
 (0.0023) (0.0018) 
D Soft 0.0336*** 0.0167** 
 (0.0048) (0.0069) 
Trend 0.0022*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Intercept  -14.1868*** -9.3489*** 
 (1.9703) (1.7030) 
Log Likelihood -507.8167 -669.8952 
N 547 547 
Note: HAC Newey-West Standard Errors in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, 
***p ≤ 0.01 
Like the previous equations, these ones exhibit the theoretically expected contrasts between 
business and individual donations.  As before the campaign displays a larger increase in 
individual donations than business donations, consistent with the idea that the campaign is 
associated with ideological donations and individuals are more likely to be ideologically 
motivated.  Effectively, of course, this means the 2017 election campaign.  Days since the 
election has virtually the same effect on business donations, as it has in the much longer time 
series.  However, the effect on individual donations is over twice its previous size.  Again, 
this fits the hypothesis that individual donations are more ideological and ideological 
donations are more likely to be made as an election approaches.  The Hard and Soft variables 
have a greater effect on business donations than on individual donations.  The coefficient for 
Hard in the business equation is about one third larger than in the individual equation.  Soft 
has a much bigger effect in both equations and the coefficient in the business equations is 
almost twice the size of its equivalent in the individual model.  The metric of the Hard and 
Soft variables produces small coefficients.  Table 3 uses Incidence Rate Ratios to calculate the 
impact of one standard deviation changes in Hard and Soft on business donations.   
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TABLE 3 Substantive implications of Model 3 
Variable Counterfactual 
Change in annual 
donations 
Percentage change 
in annual donations 
D Hard 26 fewer articles 33 16 
D Soft 9 more articles 68 33 
Conservative Lead 5.9 per cent reduction -91 -44 
Note: Counterfactuals based on one standard deviation changes in Brexit sample.  Donations refers to distinct 
business donors giving £7500 or above.   
As with Brexit itself, different versions of Brexit have large effects on business donations.  A 
one standard deviation decrease in articles mentioning “Hard Brexit” implies a sixteen per cent 
increase in donations.  A one standard deviation increase in “Soft Brexit” is predicted to 
increase donations by thirty three per cent.  For comparison, a one standard deviation reduction 
(5.9 per cent) in the Conservative lead is associated with a forty four per cent reduction in 
annual business donations.  Obviously, this analysis is restricted to a much shorter period than 
the earlier models.  Furthermore, this is a particularly volatile period in British politics.  For 
example, Prime Minister Theresa May called an election in 2017 to exploit her commanding 
lead in opinion polls, but her popularity, and that of her party, plummeted in the few weeks of 
the campaign.  Also, the volume of mentions of Soft Brexit is a little bit thin for the sort of 
inferences I am hoping to make.  Nonetheless, the evidence clearly points towards business 
sensitivity to more subtle moves on the globalisation dimension, as part of the Brexit 
negotiations within the Conservative Party and between the UK and the EU.   
 
Conclusions 
Preferences matter, but sometimes they can be taken for granted.  The partisan preferences of 
business donors can no longer be assumed because of the demise of the consensus on 
globalisation.  The role of the state in the economy and the management of inequality continues 
to be contested, as it has been since the first mass-suffrage elections.  This dimension has 
recently been separated from contestation of the extent to which the state will engage in 
frameworks of multilateral economic governance.  The sources of preferences matter too.  If 
business donors are party identifiers, changes of position on either of these salient dimensions 
should have little effect on their behaviour. If business donors make calculations on the basis 
of the location of parties in the policy space, shifts of position in that space will change donation 
decisions.  If centre-right parties move away from their previous pro-globalisation position and 
consequently lose the financial backing of business this may have positive democratic 
consequences in the area of political finance.  Where parties are dependent on business for 
funding, they have incentives to resist transparency, limits on donations, and public funding.  
Consequently, if centre-right parties decided they do not need business funding, they may allow 
reforms that ensure that citizens, not firms, fund party competition. 
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The electoral consequences depend on the direct effect of policy changes on voters (voters 
gained less voters lost) and the indirect effect of voters lost due to more meagre financial 
resources.  Vote-seeking and office-seeking are not always the same thing in multi-party 
systems.  Shifts away from globalisation may increase the chances of new coalitions with the 
populist or radical right but reduce the likelihood of more traditional coalitions with liberal 
parties.  Coalitions with parties that are more hostile to globalisation, and may previously have 
been pariahs, are also likely to reduce business funding.  The British case offers both 
reassurance and a warning to other business-funded parties considering a foray along the 
globalisation dimension.  It is reassuring that the financial flood from Corbyn’s election was 
greater than the financial drought attributable to Brexit.  This suggests that the left-right 
dimension remains more salient than the globalisation dimension.  A pro-business position on 
the left-right dimension may allow centre-right parties to limit the financial damage from anti-
globalisation moves.  It is a warning that Brexit would have been a severe financial constraint 
for the Conservatives if it were not for Labour’s lurch to the left.  Other centre-right parties 
cannot rely on their competitors to be so obliging.   
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